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ABSTRACT
While substantial research finds that financial development boosts overall economic growth, we
study whether financial development disproportionately raises the incomes of the poor and alleviates
poverty.  Using  a  broad  cross-country  sample,  we  distinguish  among  competing  theoretical
predictions about the impact of financial development on changes in income distribution and poverty
alleviation. We find that financial development reduces income inequality by disproportionately
boosting  the  incomes  of  the  poor.  Countries  with  better-developed  financial  intermediaries
experience faster declines in measures of both poverty and income inequality. These results are
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Stunningly high levels of poverty characterize much of the world. In 2001, 2.7 billion 
people, more than half of the earth’s inhabitants, lived on less than $2 a day, and 1.1 billion lived on 
less than $1 a day.
1 Even these figures mask the extremes plaguing some parts of the world. In 
South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, only one-quarter of the people live on more than $2 per day.  
In accounting for changes in poverty, the literature notes that poverty alleviation can be 
decomposed into two parts: Faster economic growth and changes in the distribution of income. 
Indeed, depending on the precise definition of poverty, an arithmetic identity links poverty 
alleviation, growth, and changes in income distribution (Bourguignon, 2004).
2 Besley and Burgesss 
(2003) illustrate the potential importance of both growth and changes in income distribution. They 
calculate that (1) developing countries need a GDP per capita growth rate of 3.8 percent to cut 
poverty in half by 2015, which is twice the growth rate of recent decades, and (2) a one standard 
deviation decline in the Gini coefficient of inequality would cut poverty by about half in regions 
with highly skewed income distributions such as Latin America and Africa.
3 Thus, both GDP per 
capita growth and changes in income distribution may reduce poverty.
4
Although a large literature finds that financial development produces faster economic 
growth, it is unclear whether financial development alleviates poverty. The bulk of existing 
                                                 
1 These are based on Purchasing Power Parity exchange rates from the World Bank. 
2 For example, let YP equal the per capita income of the lowest quintile, Y equals average income per capita, and L is 
the Lorenz curve which related the share of income received to the share of the population. Then, Yp = Y*L(0.2)/0.2. 
Now differentiate with respect to time and compute growth rates, letting g(x) represent the growth rate of variable x. 
This yields g(Yp) = g(Y) + g(L(0.2). The growth of per capita income of the poorest quintile equals the growth of 
average per capita income plus the growth of the Lorenz curve, which captures changes in income distribution. 
3 In terms of income inequality, the poorest fifth of the families in the average country received less than 6% of that 
nation’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This statistic examines income inequality within each country and then 
averages across countries. When focusing on people, not countries, world income is even more skewed. According the 
UN Development Report, the poorest 20 percent of the people receive less than 1.5% of the world’s income. 
4 In terms of determining whether growth or income distribution changes accounts for more of poverty alleviation, 
Kraay (2004) finds that growth accounts for the bulk of poverty reductions in a broad cross-country study, while 
Ravallion (2001) provides specific country examples where both matter for poverty alleviation. 
  1empirical research suggests that financial development is positively associated with growth and this 
relationship is not due to reverse causality.
5 Thus, if financial development does not intensify 
income inequality, financial development will help reduce poverty by boosting overall economic 
growth (Dollar and Kraay 2002). But, researchers have not determined whether financial 
development benefits the whole population, whether it primarily benefits the rich, or whether 
financial development disproportionately helps the poor. 
This paper examines the relationship between financial development and both changes in the 
distribution of income and changes in the level of poverty. We do not reexamine the finance-growth 
link, nor do we reexamine the relationship between financial development and the level of income 
inequality (Clarke, Xu, and Zou, 2003) or the level of poverty (Honohan, 2004a). Rather, we 
provide the first assessment of the impact of financial development on changes in income inequality 
and changes in poverty. Thus, our approach complements the finance and growth literature by 
examining whether financial development exerts a disproportionately large influence on the poor. 
Theory provides conflicting predictions about the relationship between financial 
development and changes in poverty and income distribution. Some models imply that financial 
development enhances growth and reduces inequality. Financial market imperfections, such as 
informational asymmetries, transactions costs, and contract enforcement costs, may be especially 
binding on poor entrepreneurs who lack collateral, credit histories, and connections. These credit 
constraints will impede the flow of capital to poor individuals with high-return projects (Galor and 
Zeira, 1993),
6 thereby reducing the efficiency of capital allocation and intensifying income 
                                                 
5 While much research indicates that finance causes growth, considerable debate remains. For reviews of this literature, 
see Levine (1997, 2005). Aghion, Howitt, and Mayer-Foulkes (2005) raise serious questions about whether the financial 
development affects steady-state growth, and instead find that finance influences the rate of convergence.  
6 Banerjee and Newman (1993) and Aghion and Bolton (1997) introduce moral-hazard considerations with limited 
liability as the explicit financial market imperfection and study the impact on income distribution and growth. Benabou 
(1996), Mookherjee and Ray (2003), and Aghion and Howitt (1998, chapter 1) provide additional theoretical 
contributions on the linkages between inequality and economic growth. 
  2inequality. From this perspective, financial development reduces poverty by (i) disproportionately 
relaxing credit constraints on the poor and reducing income inequality and (ii) improving the 
allocation of capital and accelerating growth.  
Other theories, however, question whether financial development reduces poverty. Some 
research suggests that the poor primarily rely on informal, family connections for capital, so that 
improvements in the formal financial sector primarily help the rich.
7 Along these lines, Greenwood 
and Jovanovic (1990) develop a model that predicts a nonlinear relationship between financial 
development and income inequality during the process of economic development. At early stages of 
development, only the rich can afford to access and profit from financial markets so that financial 
development intensifies income inequality. At higher levels of economic development, financial 
development helps an increasing proportion of society. Furthermore, some models imply that if 
financial development reduces income inequality, this could slow aggregate growth and increase 
poverty. Specifically, if the rich save more than the poor, and financial development reduces income 
inequality, this could reduce aggregate savings and slow growth with adverse ramifications on 
poverty (Bourguignon, 2001a).
8 Thus, empirical evidence on the impact of finance on the 
distribution of income and poverty will help distinguish among competing theoretical predictions. 
Methodologically, this paper assesses the relationship between financial development, 
poverty alleviation, and changes in the distribution of income using broad cross-country 
comparisons. Since different problems plague income distribution and poverty data, we use both to 
assess the robustness of the results. More specifically, we use two specifications to examine the 
                                                 
7 See discussions surrounding this theme in Haber, et al. (2003) and Bourguignon and Verdier (2000).  But, more 
competitive financial markets may permit greater access to financial services (Rajan and Zingales, 2003). 
8 Galor and Moav (2005) develop a model that integrates two themes in the inequality and growth literature. Under the 
assumption that savings rates are an increasing function of wealth, inequality positively impacts growth at early stages 
of economic development when physical capital accumulation is the key source of growth. At later stages of 
development, credit market imperfections become crucial as human capital accumulation becomes the prime engine of 
growth. Thus, income equality ameliorates the adverse implications of credit constraints on human capital accumulation 
with positive ramifications on economic growth. 
  3relationship between finance and income distribution and two additional specifications to 
investigate the finance-poverty alleviation nexus. First, we examine the impact of financial 
development on the growth rate of the income of each economy’s poorest 20 percent. We assess the 
effect of finance on income growth of the poor while controlling for average per capita GDP 
growth. Although income growth of the poor is not a consistent measure of poverty across countries 
at different levels of economic development, this specification provides information on whether 
financial development influences the poorest quintile differently from its effect on average growth. 
By conditioning on average growth, we test whether financial development exerts a 
disproportionately large impact on the poor. Second, we continue our assessment of the 
distributional consequences of financial development by examining the growth rate of the Gini 
coefficient, which measures deviations from perfect income equality. Again, by controlling for 
average per capita GDP growth, we provide information on how financial development alters the 
distribution of income beyond its impact on aggregate growth. Then, we turn to direct measures of 
poverty alleviation. In our third specification, we examine the growth rate of the percentage of the 
population living under $1 a day (and $2 a day in robustness tests). By controlling for average per 
capita GDP growth, we test whether financial development exerts a positive, negative, or no 
influence on poverty beyond the impact of finance on average per capita GDP growth. Finally, we 
conduct the same experiment, but we use the growth rate of the Poverty Gap measure, which not 
only measures the percentage of the population living under $1 a day, but also weighs this 
percentage by how far below $1 a day incomes lie. Again, we assess the impact of financial 
development on poverty alleviation while controlling for average growth. 
  4We find that financial development alleviates poverty and reduces income inequality. Thus, 
the data indicate that financial development exerts a disproportionately positive influence on the 
poor. Since existing work finds that financial development accelerates aggregate growth, our 
findings suggest that financial development alleviates poverty both by boosting growth and by 
reducing income inequality. 
More specifically, there are three key findings. First, even when controlling for real per 
capita GDP growth, financial development boosts the growth rate of the poorest quintile’s income. 
This suggests that financial development reduces income inequality. Second, financial development 
induces a drop in the Gini coefficient measure of income inequality. Again, the negative 
relationship between financial development and the growth rate of the Gini coefficient holds when 
controlling for real per capita GDP growth. This result further emphasizes that financial 
development reduces income inequality beyond the relationship between finance and aggregate 
growth. Third, financial development reduces the fraction of the population living on less than $1 a 
day (or $2 a day) and financial development lowers the Poverty Gap. Again, the positive 
relationship between financial development and poverty alleviation holds even when controlling for 
average per capita GDP growth. Furthermore, these results hold when using instrumental variables 
to control for the endogenous determination of financial development and when conditioning on a 
large number of other country characteristics. In sum, using different datasets, we find that financial 
development lowers poverty and reduces income inequality by exerting a disproportionately 
positive impact on the poor. 
This paper is related to a large public policy oriented literature on the relationship between 
inequality and economic growth. While “… the conventional textbook approach is that inequality is 
good for incentives and therefore good for growth” (Aghion et al, 1999, p. 1615), considerable work 
  5actually suggests that income inequality hurts growth.
9 To explain this negative relationship 
between inequality and growth, many theoretical models assume financial market imperfections 
impede the efficient allocation of capital (e.g., Aghion and Bolton, 1997; Banerjee and Newman, 
1993; Galor and Zeira, 1993). Taking the financial market frictions as given and ignoring incentive 
effects, these models suggest that public policies that redistribute income from the rich to the poor 
will alleviate the adverse growth effects of income inequality and therefore boost aggregate growth. 
Our paper instead highlights an alternative policy approach: Financial sector reforms that reduce 
market frictions will lower income inequality and boost growth without the potential incentive 
problems associated with policies that redistribute resources.   
Our research also relates to work on how capital market imperfections influence child labor 
and schooling. Using household data from Peru, Jacoby (1994) finds that lack of access to credit 
perpetuates poverty because poor households reduce their kids’ education. Jacoby and Skoufias 
(1997) show that households from Indian villages without access to credit markets tend to reduce 
their children’s schooling when they receive transitory shocks more than households with greater 
access to financial markets. Similarly, Dehejia and Gatti (2003) find that child labor rates are higher 
in countries with under-developed financial systems, while Beegle, et al. (2003) show that transitory 
income shocks lead to greater increases in child labor in countries with poorly functioning financial 
systems. We contribute to this research by examining the aggregate relationship between financial 
development and both poverty alleviation and income inequality. 
While our results are robust to different specifications, our analyses face several limitations. 
First, we use cross-country regressions, so the results are subject to the usual criticisms of cross-
country studies (Levine and Zervos, 1993). Nonetheless, each methodology suffers from various 
                                                 
9 See Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Perotti (1993, 1996), Person and Tabellini (1994), Clarke (1995), and Easterly (2002).  
Though, also see Banerjee and Duflo (2003), Barro (2000), Forbes (2000), and Lundberg and Squire (2003). For 
reviews of the literature, see Benabou (1996) and Aghion, Caroli, and Garcia-Penalosa (1999). 
  6shortcomings and these cross-country comparisons provide evidence on a crucial issue: poverty 
alleviation. Second, we use an aggregate index of financial development that equals credit issued by 
financial intermediaries to private firms as a share of GDP. This index does not measure the degree 
to which the population in general or the poor in particular access financial services. Nevertheless, 
in this initial study, it is crucial to ascertain whether a standard measure of financial development, 
which past studies find explains economic growth, also helps account for cross-country differences 
in poverty reduction rates and changes in income inequality. Third, income distribution and poverty 
are measured with error (Lundberg and Squire, 2003; Dollar and Kraay, 2002). However, unless 
this measurement error is correlated with financial development in a very particular manner, 
measurement error will bias the results against finding a relationship between financial 
development and changes in income inequality. Finally, although our results show the importance 
of financial intermediaries for the poor, they are silent on how to foster poverty-reducing financial 
development.
10  Future work needs to examine the linkages between particular policies toward the 
financial sector and poverty alleviation. 
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data and describes 
the methodology. Section 3 discusses the results and section 4 concludes. 
 
                                                 
10 For instance, on bank supervision, see Barth, Caprio, and Levine, 2004, 2005; Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven, and Levine, 
2004; and Caprio, Laeven, and Levine 2004). 
  7II.  Data, Summary Statistics, and Econometric Methodologies 
This section describes the variables, provides summary statistics and correlations, and 
discusses the econometric methodologies we use to assess the relationship between financial 
development, poverty alleviation, and changes in income distribution. Table 1 lists the main 
variables by country. 
 
A. Data: Financial Development 
To measure financial development, we would ideally like indicators of the degree to which 
the financial system ameliorates information and transactions costs and facilitates the mobilization 
and efficient allocation of capital. Specifically, we would like indicators of how well each financial 
system researches firms and identifies profitable projects, exerts corporate control, facilitates risk 
management, mobilizes savings, and eases transactions. Unfortunately, no such measures are 
available across countries. Consequently, we rely on a commonly used measure of financial 
development that existing work shows is robustly related to economic growth. 
Private Credit equals the value of credit by financial intermediaries to the private sector 
divided by GDP. This measure excludes credits issued by the central bank and development banks. 
Furthermore, it excludes credit to the public sector, credit to state-owned enterprises, and cross 
claims of one group of intermediaries on another. Thus, Private Credit captures the amount of credit 
channeled from savers, through financial intermediaries, to private firms. Private Credit is a 
comparatively comprehensive measure of credit issuing intermediaries since it also includes the 
credits of financial intermediaries that are not considered deposit money banks. After controlling for 
endogeneity, Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000) and Beck, Levine, and Loayza (2000) show a robust 
positive relationship between Private Credit and the growth rate of GDP per capita. Data on Private 
  8Credit are from the updated version of the Financial Structure Database (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Levine, 2001). There is a wide variation in Private Credit, ranging from less than 5% in Ghana, 
Sierra Leone, and Uganda to more than 120% in Hong Kong, Japan, and the Netherlands using data 
over the period 1980 to 2000. As we describe below, we sometimes use data averaged over the 
period 1960-1999, and sometimes we use data over the period 1980-2000 depending on the other 
variables and specification. 
 
B. Data: Changes in Income Distribution and Poverty Alleviation 
To assess the impact of financial development on the poor, we examine (i) the growth of the 
income of the poorest quintile in each economy, (ii) the growth of the Gini coefficient, (iii) the 
growth of the percentage of the population living on less than $1 (and $2) dollars per day, and (iv) 
changes in a poverty gap indicator, which not only measures the fraction of the population living 
below $1 dollar per day, but also how far below this line incomes lie. The remainder of this 
subsection defines these dependent variables in more depth. 
Income Growth of the Poor equals the annual growth rate of the average per capita income 
of the lowest income quintile, computed over the period 1960-1999 (Dollar and Kraay, 2002). More 
specifically, we calculate the annual growth rate of the per capita income of the lowest income 
quintile by taking the difference between the log of the average income per capita of those in the 
lowest income quintile for the last observation and the log of the average income per capita of those 
in the lowest income quintile for the first observation, and dividing this log difference by the 
number of years between the two observations. Income of the poorest quintile is computed in 
constant 1985 US dollars using PPP exchange rates.  
  9We use Income Growth of the Poor to assess how financial development influences the 
poorest segment of each economy. Income Growth of the Poor is not a direct measure of income 
distribution, nor is it a consistent measure of poverty across countries. The poorest quintile in a rich 
country could be quite affluent compared to the median person in a poor country. Nevertheless, 
since we also control for the growth rate of overall GDP per capita, examining Income Growth of 
the Poor allows us to assess whether financial development exerts a disproportionately large impact 
on the poorest quintile. Some countries enjoyed rates of Income Growth of the Poor above five 
percent per annum (Finland, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Norway, and Singapore). Others actually 
suffered negative rates of Income Growth of the Poor of worse than two percent per year (Panama, 
Sierra Leone, and Zambia).  
Growth of Gini equals the annual growth rate of each country’s Gini coefficient, computed 
over the period 1960-1999. More specifically, the Gini coefficient is derived from the Lorenz curve, 
which plots the cumulative percentage of the population on the horizontal axis and the cumulative 
percentage of income on the vertical axis for each country. A 45-degree diagonal line on this graph 
depicts a situation where there is perfectly even income distribution, such that, for example, 20 
percent of the population receives 20 percent of the income, and 50 percent of the population 
receives 50 percent of the income. To measure income inequality, the Gini coefficient equals the 
ratio of the area between the Lorenz curve and the 45-degree line divided by the area below the 45-
degree line. Since the Lorenz curve equals the 45-degree line when there is perfect income equality, 
the Gini coefficient equals zero when perfect equality holds. The Gini coefficient ranges between 
zero – perfect equality -and one, where larger values imply greater income inequality.
 11  We use the 
first and last observation from the Dollar and Kraay (2002) database and calculate the annual 
                                                 
11 We confirm the conclusions using the standard deviation of the income shares, which is highly correlated with the 
Gini coefficient. 
  10growth rate by dividing the log difference of the last and the first observations by the number of 
years between the two observations.  
For both Income Growth of the Poor and Growth of Gini, we require a minimum of 20 years 
difference between the first and last observation when computing growth rates. On average, there 
are 30 years between the first and last observation when computing growth rates, with a maximum 
of 40 years.
12  This produces identical coverage for the two data series (Income Growth of the Poor 
and Growth of Gini) and yields a sample of 52 developing and developed countries. Critically, we 
match other data – e.g. Private Credit and GDP per capita growth and Private Credit – with the 
sample period covered by Growth of Gini (and Income Growth of the Poor) in regressions where 
Growth of Gini (or Income Growth of the Poor) is the dependent variable. 
It is worthwhile comparing information on Income Growth of the Poor and Growth of Gini. 
From Table 1, note that in Egypt, Finland, France, and Norway, the Gini coefficient shrank at a rate 
of more than one percent per annum, while the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, and the United States 
saw the Gini coefficient grow at almost one percent per annum. Also, observe that Egypt, Finland, 
France, Japan, and Singapore, and Norway Hong Kong enjoyed rapid rates of Income Growth of the 
Poor. As stressed by Besley and Burgess (2003), countries may experience very rapid Income 
Growth of the Poor because of rapid declines in Gini coefficients (Egypt, Finland, France, and 
Norway) and countries may enjoy rapid Income Growth of the Poor because the economy is 
enjoying rapid overall growth (Japan, Singapore, and Hong Kong).  
Next, we consider two measures of poverty intensification. 
Growth of Headcount equals the growth rate in the percentage of the population living 
below $1 dollar per day (or $2 dollars per day). These data are based on household surveys (Chen 
                                                 
12 We could not compute regression-based growth rates because many countries do not have data for every year and 
therefore lack sufficient observations. 
  11and Ravallion, 2001). We use data for 58 developing countries. To assess the robustness of our 
results, we use two alternative definitions of poverty: $1 per day and $2 per day.
13  Using 
Purchasing Power Parity exchange rates, these two definitions of poverty are converted into local 
currency and we determine the fraction of the population living below each line. Then, we compute 
the annual log growth rate using the last and first available observations on the fraction of the 
population living below the $1 and $2 per day poverty lines respectively, divided by the number of 
years between the first and last observation.
14
Growth of Poverty Gap equals the growth rate of the Poverty Gap, where the Poverty Gap 
is computed as a weighted measure of (i) the fraction of the population living on less than one dollar 
per day and (ii) how far below one dollar per day incomes lie. Specifically, the Poverty Gap is the 
mean shortfall from the poverty line, expressed as a percentage of the poverty line. Again, we 
define the poverty line as either 1$ or 2$ per day and convert this into local currency using PPP 
exchange rates. Thus, the Poverty Gap measures both the breadth and depth of poverty (Chen and 
Ravallion, 2001). Then, we compute the Growth of Poverty Gap as the log difference between last 
and first available observation on the Poverty Gap, divided by the number of years between the first 
and last observation. 
There are greater data limitations regarding the direct measures of poverty intensification 
(Growth of Headcount and Growth of Poverty Gap) than for Income Growth of the Poor and 
Growth of Gini. The data on Headcount and Poverty Gap are only available for the 1980s and 
1990s, and frequently only for the 1990s. Thus, we do not use a 20-year minimum and simply 
calculate the annualized growth rates of Headcount and Poverty Gap for the longest available time 
                                                 
13 However, see Pritchett (2003) who proposes much higher poverty lines. 
14 These data are available at http://research.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/jsp/index.jsp. 
  12span.
15  Using shorter time frames could magnify the influence of any outlier observations and 
make the results more sensitive to business cycle fluctuations or crises. Therefore, we assess the 
robustness of our results by (i) limiting the sample to countries for which the growth rate in 
Headcount and Poverty gap is calculated over at least five years and (ii) eliminating outliers.  
Table 1 indicates that there is wide variation across countries in poverty alleviation rates 
over the last two decades. The share of population living on less than a dollar per day increased at 
an annual rate of 39% in Poland between 1992 and 1998. Headcount decreased by an annual rate of 
21% in Jamaica between 1988 and 2000. 
 
C. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations        
Panel A of Table 2 presents descriptive statistics and Panels B and C present correlations for 
the 1960-99 and 1980-99 samples, respectively. Consistent with earlier work, financial development 
is positively and significantly correlated with GDP per capita growth. Private Credit is also 
positively and significantly correlated with the Income Growth of the Poor, but is not significantly 
correlated with Growth of Gini. The Table confirms the Dollar and Kraay (2002) result that the 
Income Growth of the Poor is closely correlated (0.81) with overall GDP per capita growth. Also, 
there is a significant, negative correlation (-0.49) between the Income Growth of the Poor and 
Growth of Gini, which can be partly explained by the very high correlation between the income 
share of the poorest income quintile and the Gini coefficient. There is not a significant correlation 
between GDP per capita growth and either Growth of Headcount or Growth of Poverty Gap. 
However, Private Credit is significantly and negatively correlated with both Growth of Headcount 
and Growth of Poverty Gap, indicating that countries with more developed financial systems 
                                                 
15 Unlike in the income distribution regressions, we include poverty data of transition economies outside the Former 
Soviet Union after 1990. We do not include the countries of the Former Soviet Union due to data quality and 
availability. 
  13experienced a faster reduction in the number of people living in poverty.  We also find a very high 
correlation (0.93) between Growth of Headcount and Growth of Poverty Gap.  
 
D. Econometric Methodologies: Basic Regression Specifications 
This subsection sketches the basic regression specifications used to examine the relationship 
between financial development and poverty alleviation and income inequality. Here, we simply 
describe ordinary least squares equations (OLS). The next subsection discusses how we deal with 
potential simultaneity bias. We use cross-country regressions, calculating growth rates of income, 
inequality and poverty over the longest available time period and averaging financial intermediary 
development and other explanatory variables over the corresponding time period.  This approach 
differs from Dollar and Kraay (2002) and Lopez (2003) who use panel techniques.  We focus on 
cross-country regressions for two reasons.  First, we are assessing theories that focus on the long-
run relationship between financial development and poverty alleviation, and therefore we want to 
abstract of business-cycle forces and crises that may influence banking systems and poverty in the 
short-run.  Second, the poverty data in particular, but also the inequality data, are available for only 
a limited number of years and sometimes with gaps in the time-series.  Since small samples can 
make the dynamic panel estimates unstable and unreliable as discussed in Beck and Levine (2004a), 
we examine the long-run relationship between financial development and (i) income growth of the 
poor, (ii) changes in income inequality, and (iii) rates of poverty alleviation.
16
 
D.1. Income Growth of the Poor 
To evaluate the impact of financial development on income growth of the poorest income 
                                                 
16 Also, the GMM difference estimator used by Lopez (2003) abstracts from cross-country variation and only assesses 
time-series relationships. 
  14quintile, we use data averaged over the period 1960-99 and use the following regression 
specification.  
, / ) ( , , , , , , i i i n t p i n t p i t p i X FD y n y y ε γ β α + + + = − − −    (1) 
In this regression, yi,p,t is the logarithm of average per capita income of the poorest income quintile 
in country i in year t,  yi,t is the logarithm of average overall GDP per capita, FDi is our Private 
Credit measure of financial development in country i, and Xi is a set of conditioning information for 
country i.
17  We control for the logarithm of the average years of school attainment in 1960 as an 
indicator of the initial human capital stock in the economy (Schooling 1960), the growth rate of the 
GDP deflator over the period 1960-99 to control for the macroeconomic environment (Inflation) 
and the sum of exports and imports as share of GDP to capture the degree of international openness 
(Trade Openness).  As noted, the period of aggregation, n, is at least 20 years. 
The coefficient β in regression equation (1) captures the relationship between financial 
development and the growth rate of the average income of the poorest 20 percent of society. This 
regression set-up does not allow us to assess how much of the effect of Private Credit is due to its 
positive effect on overall GDP per capita growth and how much is due to distributional effects that 
influence the poorest income quintile relative to other income groups.  
To better understand the distributional effect of financial development, we follow Dollar and 
Kraay (2002) and control for real GDP per capita growth in the regression. Specifically, we modify 
equation (1) by including average growth as a regressor.  
, / ) ( / ) ( , , , , , , , , i n t p i i i n t i t i n t p i t p i y X FD n y y n y y ε λ γ β α + + + + − = − − − −    (2) 
The coefficient α indicates the relationship between the growth rate of average per capita 
                                                 
17 In line with the finance and growth literature (Levine, 2005), we include Private Credit in logs to control for non-
linearities in the relationship. 
  15income of the poor and overall per capita GDP growth. If the average income of the poorest quintile 
grows faster than average per capita GDP growth, α will be greater than one. If the income of the 
poorest quintile grows more slowly than average, α will be less than one.   
The coefficient β indicates whether there is any differential effect of financial development 
on income growth of the poorest quintile beyond any impact on overall GDP per capita growth. 
Thus, if financial development only boosts the income growth of the poor by increasing overall 
economic growth, then β will equal zero. If financial development exerts a particularly positive 
impact on the rich, then β will be negative. And, if financial development exerts a 
disproportionately positive impact on the poorest quintile, then β will enter positively.
18     
  D.2. Growth of Gini 
To further assess the distributional effects of financial development, we examine Growth of 
Gini: 
, / ) ( / ) ( , , , , , i n t i i i n t i t i n t i t i G X FD n y y n G G ε λ γ β α + + + + − = − − − −  (3) 
where Gi,t is the log of the Gini coefficient in country i in period t. As before, the time period n is at 
least 20 years. As in regression (2), we include the GDP per capita growth rate to (a) separate the 
distributional effect of Private Credit from the aggregate growth effect and (b) control for any effect 
that GDP per capita growth has on income distribution (Bourguignon, 2001b). If financial 
development does not affect the distribution of income, then β will equal zero. If financial 
development reduces income inequality, then β will be negative. And, if financial development 
exacerbates income inequality, then β will enter positively. 
                                                 
18 Unlike Dollar and Kraay (2002), we also include log of initial income of the poor to control for convergence forces.  
As shown, however, the findings hold when excluding initial income. 
  16D.3. Growth of Headcount and Growth of Poverty Gap  
We also explore the impact of financial development on direct measures of poverty 
alleviation. To do this, we regress Growth of Headcount and Growth of Poverty Gap on financial 
development, while controlling for the overall growth rate of GDP per capita, and each country’s 
initial poverty level. 
i n t i i i n t i t i n t i t i P X FD n y y n P P ε λ γ β α + + + + − = − − − − , , , , , / ) ( / ) (  (4) 
In this equation, Pi, t is the log of Headcount or Poverty gap in country i in year t.  
Again, by controlling for GDP per capita growth, we identify the relationship between 
financial development and poverty alleviation conditional on aggregate economic growth. Thus, this 
equation also captures the distributional effect of Private Credit on poverty alleviation because we 
control for the effect of financial development on poverty that runs through overall economic 
growth. Since the sample periods vary significantly across countries, we match the sample period 
for GDP per capita growth with the period used to compute Growth of Headcount and Growth of 
Poverty Gap. We take the average of Private Credit over the period 1980 to 2000 to abstract from 
business cycle or crisis frequencies.
19
 
E. Econometric Methodologies: Instrumental Variables  
To control for potential reverse causation and simultaneity bias, we use instrumental 
variable (IV) regressions. The relationship between financial intermediary development and 
changes in income distribution and poverty might be driven by reverse causation.  For example, 
reductions in poverty may stimulate demands for financial services.  As another example, 
                                                 
19 For the transition economies, we include Private Credit averaged over the period 1991 to 2000. 
  17reductions in income inequality might lead to political pressures to create more efficient financial 
systems that fund projects based on market criteria, not political connections.  
To select instrumental variables for financial development, we focus on exogenous national 
characteristics that theory and past empirical work suggest influence financial development. We 
follow the finance and growth literature and use the legal origin of countries and the absolute value 
of the latitude of the capital city, normalized between zero and one, as instrumental variables. In 
particular, an extensive literature holds that British common law countries do a comparatively better 
job than French civil, German civil, Scandinavian civil, or Socialist law countries at protecting 
private property rights, fostering private contracting, and hence promoting financial development 
(See La Porta et al, 1997, 1998; and the review by Beck and Levine, 2004b). Furthermore, an 
extensive literature holds that natural resource endowments, which are imperfectly proxied by 
latitude, help explain the development of national institutions (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 
2001; Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997; and Easterly and Levine, 2003). Previous research 
demonstrates that both legal origin and latitude explain cross-country differences in financial 
development (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2003). We also tried alternative instrument sets, 
including the religious composition of countries and ethnic fractionalization based on research by 
Stulz and Williamson (2003) and Easterly and Levine (1997) respectively, and obtained very 
similar results. 
To test the appropriateness of the instruments, we use the Hansen test of the overidentifying 
restrictions, which assesses whether the instrumental variables are associated with the dependent 
variable beyond their ability to explain cross-country variation in Private Credit. Under the joint 
null hypothesis that the excluded instruments (i.e., the instruments not included in the second stage 
regression) are valid instruments, i.e., uncorrelated with the error term, and that the excluded 
  18instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation, the Hansen test is distributed χ
2 in 
the number of overidentifying restrictions. Failure to reject the null hypothesis implies a failure to 
reject the validity of the instrumental variables. In the tables, we provide the p-values of this test of 
the overidentifying restrictions and refer to it as “OIR Test”. Furthermore, appropriate instruments 
must explain cross-country variation in financial development.  In all the regressions reported 
below, we reject the null hypothesis that the exogenous variables do not explain cross-country 
variation in financial development. 
 
III. Empirical  Results 
A.  Changes in Income Distribution 
A.1. Income Growth of the Poor 
The Table 3 results indicate that (i) financial development increases the growth rate of the 
incomes of the poorest quintile and (ii) financial development exerts a disproportionately large 
positive impact on the poor since finance is positively related to growth even when controlling for 
the growth rate of average per capita GDP. These results are robust to controlling for various 
country characteristics and to using instrumental variables to mitigate simultaneity bias.  
Consider first regression 1, where we conduct a preliminary analysis of the direct 
relationship between financial development and the growth rate of the incomes of the poor without 
controlling for average growth. This regression is very similar to standard cross-country growth 
regressions except that here the dependent variable is the per capita growth rate of the income of the 
poorest quintile. As in standard growth regressions, we condition on the logarithm of the initial 
level of income, which in this specification is the initial level of income of the poorest quintile in 
1960 (Initial Income of the Poor).  The regression indicates that the average income of the poorest 
  19quintile grows faster in countries with better-developed financial intermediaries.
 The log of initial 
average income of the poorest quintile enters significantly and negatively, suggesting conditional 
convergence of the poorest income quintile, i.e., the incomes of the poor grow faster in countries 
where the poor start out poorer. Since we are focusing on the income distributional consequences of 
financial development and its impact on poverty, we now turn to specifications where we control 
for average GDP per capita growth. Nonetheless, we note that (a) the regression 1 results are robust 
to controlling for Schooling in 1960, Inflation and Trade Openness and (b) the results hold when 
using instrument variables to extract the exogenous component of financial development.   
Next, by controlling for average GDP per capita growth, we examine whether financial 
development benefits the poorest income quintile relatively more than the overall population (Table 
3, regression 2). Specifically, the results in regression 1 do not distinguish the impact of financial 
development on overall per capita GDP growth from the impact of finance on the distribution of 
income. Regression 2 separates the growth and distributional effects by regressing the growth rate 
of the average income of the poorest quintile on the overall GDP per capita growth rate, log of 
initial income of the poor and Private Credit. The coefficient on Private Credit thus captures the 
effect of financial development on the poorest income quintile beyond its overall growth effect.  
There are two key results in regression 2: Financial development is particularly beneficial to 
the poor and the average income of the poor rises approximately one-for-one with overall economic 
growth. First, the positive and significant coefficient on Private Credit indicates that financial 
development disproportionately boosts the growth rate of the incomes of the poor. That is, financial 
development is positively associated with income growth of the poor beyond finance’s effect on 
overall growth. GDP per capita growth enters positively and significantly in regression 2. Second, 
consistent with Dollar and Kraay (2002), we cannot reject at the 10% level that the coefficient on 
  20GDP per capita growth equals one, so that the average income of the poor increases proportionally 
with overall GDP per capita growth. In robustness tests, we confirm that these OLS results are 
robust to controlling for Inflation and Trade Openness. Finally, note in regression 3 of Table 3 that 
the results hold when excluding the logarithm of Initial Income of the Poor from the regression. 
Figure 1 (i) displays the positive relationship between Private Credit and Income Growth of 
the Poor while controlling for GDP per capita growth and (ii) illustrates the potential importance of 
controlling for outliers.  In particular, Figure 1 presents a partial scatter plot of Income Growth of 
the Poor against Private Credit and includes the estimated regression line. Using regression 2 of 
Table, which regresses Income Growth of the Poor against GDP per capita growth and Private 
Credit, this figure represents the two-dimensional representation of the regression plane in Income 
Growth of the Poor – Private Credit space.  To obtain this figure, we regress Income Growth of the 
Poor on GDP per capita growth and Initial Income of the Poor, collect the residuals, and call them 
e(Income Growth of the Poor | X).  Next, we regress Private Credit against GDP per capita growth 
and Initial Income of the Poor, collect the residuals, and call them e( Private Credit | X ). Figure 1 
plots e(Income Growth of the Poor | X) against e( Private Credit | X ).  Figure 1 suggests that 
outliers may exert an excessively large influence on the relationship between financial development 
and income growth of the poor. To assess the impact of outliers, therefore, we used the 
recommendations of Besley, Kuh, and Welsch (1980) for assessing the influence of individual 
observations. We (i) computed the change in the coefficient on Private Credit when the ith 
observation is omitted from the regression, (ii) scale the change by the estimated standard error of 
the coefficient, (iii) take the absolute value, and (iv) call the result ∆βi. Then, we use the Belsley, 
Kuh, and Welsch recommendation of a critical value of two, and identify those observations where 
abs (∆βi) > 2/sqrt (n), where abs(x) yields the absolute value of x, sqrt(x) yields the square root of x, 
  21and n represents the number of observations in the regression.  When we do this and omit outlier 
countries (those countries where abs (∆βi)>2/sqrt (n)), we obtain the same results.
20  Indeed, 
omitting these “outliers” increases the t-statistics on Private Credit’s estimated coefficient to above 
six without changing the coefficient estimate appreciably. 
When using instrumental variables to control for the potential endogenous determination of 
financial development, we continue to find that financial development exerts a disproportionately 
positive impact on the growth rate of incomes of the poor. Regressions 4-7 use instrumental 
variables for financial development, control for average per capita GDP growth, and also condition 
on different country characteristics.
21 Private Credit enters positively and significantly in all of the 
regressions, suggesting that financial development boosts the incomes of the poor above and 
beyond its affect on average growth. The control variables do not enter significantly.  This does not 
suggest that Trade Openness, Schooling, and Inflation are unimportant for growth. Rather, this 
result suggests that Trade Openness, Schooling, and Inflation do not have income distribution 
effects when controlling for the level of financial development. Moreover, for this paper’s purposes, 
controlling for these country traits does not change the size or the significance of the coefficient on 
Private Credit.
22 In terms of assessing the validity of the instruments, the first-stage R-squares are 
all above 0.59 and we reject the hypothesis that the exogenous variables do not explain Private 
Credit. Moreover, we do not reject the test of the overidentifying restrictions in any of the 
regressions. 
In robustness tests, we examined whether the relationship between financial development 
and income growth of the poor depends on the level of economic development or the level of 
                                                 
20 The influential observations that are omitted are Sierra Leone, Panama, Sri Lanka, and Turkey.  Figure 1 indicates 
that Sierra Leone is a particularly large outlier.  The results hold even when we only exclude Sierra Leone. 
21 We present only IV regressions, but the OLS regressions yield the same findings. 
22 Furthermore, controlling for measures of fiscal policy does not change the results on Private Credit. 
  22educational attainment based on insights by Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) and Galor and Moav 
(2005).  Besides including the level of educational attainment, we added the level of GDP per capita 
to the Table 3 regressions.  We added GDP per capita both when including and excluding the level 
of education.  In these specifications, the data continued to indicate that finance exerts a 
disproportionately positive effect on the poor even when controlling both economic growth and the 
level of economic development.  Furthermore, we included (i) the interaction term of financial 
development and the level of economic development and (ii) the interaction term of financial 
development and educational attainment.  These interaction terms do not enter significantly.  Thus, 
we found no evidence that the relationship between financial development and income growth of 
the poor varies with the level of GDP per capita or the level of educational attainment. 
  The distributional effect of Private Credit is not only statistically significant but also 
economically relevant. First, note that the coefficient on Private Credit in regression 1, which does 
not control for GDP per capita growth, is 0.031, while the coefficient on Private Credit in the same 
specification that controls for GDP per capita growth is 0.017 (regression 2). These coefficients 
suggest that about half of the overall effect of Private Credit on the income growth of the poorest 
quintile does not occur through the impact of financial development on average growth. Next, 
consider the case of Brazil. The instrumental variable results in Table 3 regression 2 indicate that 
average income of the poor in Brazil would have grown at more than 1.5% instead of 0% annually 
over the period 1960-99 if Brazil (Private Credit = 28%) had the same level of financial 
intermediary development as Korea (74%).
23 This suggests an economically large impact of 
financial development on income growth of the poor given that Brazil’s GDP per capita grew at 2% 
                                                 
23 To get this, recall that the regressors are in logs and note that the ln(0.740) - ln(0.276) = 0.99. Multiplying this with 
the coefficient in column 2 (0.016) suggests that growth would be more than 1.5% faster.  Note this is only an 
illustrative example. Such conceptual experiments do not explain how to improve financial development and the 
changes discussed above are not marginal. 
  23over the same period.  
 
A.2.: Growth of Gini 
In Table 4, we use the growth rate of the Gini coefficient measures of income distribution to 
assess the distributional consequences of financial development. The dependent variable is the 
annual growth rate in the Gini coefficient over the period 1960 - 99. Since the Gini coefficient is a 
direct measure of income distribution, we do not use the standard growth equation framework (as in 
regression 1 of Table 3). Rather, we focus on the income distribution consequences of financial and 
use specifications that include GDP per capita growth, the initial level of the Gini coefficient in 
1960 (Initial Gini), and also control for different country traits.
 24 Regression 1 presents simple OLS 
results and the other regressions use two stage least squares and different control variables. In 
sensitivity checks, we confirm that the OLS results hold when using these different control 
variables. 
The results indicate that financial development reduces income inequality. Private Credit 
enters negatively and significantly in all of the specifications. When controlling for Initial Gini, 
GDP per capita growth, Schooling 1960, the macroeconomic and international environments 
(Inflation and Trade Openness), and when using, or not using, instrumental variables to extract the 
exogenous component of Private Credit, there is a negative relationship between financial 
development and Growth of Gini. In the IV regressions, the OIR is not rejected and the instrumental 
variables (legal origins and latitude) jointly explain financial development in all the regressions. In 
terms of the other variables, Initial Gini enters negatively, suggesting that countries with initially 
highly unequal income profiles (high Initial Gini) tend to see faster reductions in income inequality 
holding other things constant. Also, the IV regressions suggest that GDP per capita growth is 
                                                 
24 We also tested for non-linearities by including the squared term of Private Credit, but it never entered significantly. 
  24associated with increases in income inequality when conditioning on financial development. This 
may create concerns that financial development intensifies income inequality by boosting growth, 
while exerting a negative direct effect on income inequality. On net, however, financial 
development reduces income inequality. We continue to find a negative and significant coefficient 
on Private Credit when we omit GDP per capita growth from the regression or when we omit Initial 
Gini. Thus, the negative impact of financial development on income inequality does not depend on 
conditioning on either GDP per capita growth or Initial Gini. 
Figure 2 provides the partial scatter plot of the Growth of Gini against Private Credit and 
again suggests that possible role of outliers.  We use the same methodology to construct Figure 2 as 
we used to construct Figure 1.  While there is clearly substantial variability, the figure illustrates a 
strong negative relationship between financial development and the growth rate of income 
inequality.  Furthermore, we use the same methodology to remove observations that may exert an 
exceptionally large impact on the slope of the regression line. Thus, following, Besley, Kuh, and 
Welsch (1980) we omit those countries where abs (∆βi)>2/sqrt (n)).
25  Omitting these “outliers” 
actually strengthens the relationship between financial development and the growth rate of the Gini 
coefficient, i.e., both the absolute value of the estimated coefficient Private Credit and its t-statistic 
increase.  Thus, outliers do not seem to drive the negative association between finance and changes 
in income inequality. 
In sum, the results in Tables 3 and 4 indicate that financial intermediary development exerts 
a disproportionately positive impact on the poor and reduces income inequality. Private Credit 
raises the incomes of the lowest income quintile beyond the overall income growth rate of incomes 
in the economy. Moreover, Private Credit reduces income inequality, as measured by the Gini 
                                                 
25 The influential observations that are omitted are Sierra Leone, Panama, Sri Lanka, the United States, and Finland. 
 
  25coefficient, when controlling for the initial level of income inequality in the economy and average 
growth. Both results hold when using two-stage least squares to control for simultaneity bias. 
 
B. Poverty Alleviation 
Next, we examine the relationship between financial development and measures of poverty 
alleviation. This has the advantage of directly assessing the focus of our investigation: poverty 
alleviation. The disadvantage is that the data cover far fewer years. For the Income Growth of the 
Poor and Growth of Gini analyses, we examined growth rates computed over an average of 30 
years, with a minimum of 20 and a maximum of 40 years. Thus, we were testing the impact of 
finance on long-run growth rates of incomes of the poor and Gini coefficients. Now, we directly 
examine poverty alleviation, but the growth rates are sometimes computed for less than five years 
and frequently for less than 10 years. This reduces confidence that these poverty alleviation results 
capture the relationship between financial development and reductions in poverty over long periods.  
To address concerns about limited time-series data on poverty, we do three things. First, we 
control for GDP per capita growth. Besides isolating the relationship between financial 
development and poverty alleviation beyond the relationship between finance and aggregate 
growth, including GDP per capita growth controls for higher frequency economic fluctuations and 
therefore provides some comfort that we assessing the long-run relationship between financial 
development and poverty alleviation. Second, we confirm the Table 5 results when limiting the 
sample to only those countries where we have a minimum of five years of data. Finally, we control 
for the logarithm of the initial values of Headcount and the Poverty Gap, respectively, and also 
condition on the general macroeconomic and international environment (Inflation and Trade 
  26Openness).
26 Besides providing general sensitivity checks, controlling for these country 
characteristics increases confidence that we are identifying the long-run relationship between 
financial development and poverty alleviation and not convergence effects or changes in the 
macroeconomic or international environment that induce a spurious correlation between finance and 
poverty alleviation. 
Financial development reduces the growth rate of the two poverty indicators: Growth of 
Headcount and Growth of Poverty Gap (Table 5). Private Credit enters negatively and significantly 
in the OLS regressions (regressions 1 and 2). Private Credit also enters negatively and significantly 
in all of the instrumental variables with different control variables, except in the Growth of Poverty 
Gap regression when we control for Schooling 1980 (regressions 3-10). In the IV regressions, the 
specification tests suggest that the instruments are valid.  The test of overidentifying restrictions is 
not rejected and the instruments jointly explain cross-country variation in Private Credit.  
Figure 3 is a partial scatter plot of the Growth of Headcount against Private Credit, which 
both illustrates the strong negative relationship between financial development and changes in 
poverty and suggests the potential influence of outliers.  We use the same methodology to construct 
Figure 3 that we describe above in relation to Figures 1 and 2.  Figure 3 clearly illustrates that 
greater financial development is associated with poverty alleviation.  Next, we use the Besley, Kuh, 
and Welsch (1980) methodology for identifying and removing observations that exert an 
exceptionally large impact on the slope of the regression line. As described in detail above, we omit 
those countries where abs (∆βi)>2/sqrt (n)).
27  Omitting these “outliers” does not change the 
estimated coefficient on Private Credit or its t-statistic.  Thus, outliers are not producing the 
negative association between finance and changes in poverty. 
                                                 
26 As noted above, these results hold when controlling for differences in fiscal policy across countries. 
27 The influential observations that are omitted are Uganda, Ghana, Laos, and Poland. 
 
  27 The effect of Private Credit on poverty alleviation is not only statistically but also 
economically substantial. Compare Chile (Private Credit = 54%) with Peru (Private Credit = 13%). 
In Chile, the percentage of the population living on less than $1 a day (Headcount) decreased at an 
annual growth rate of 14% between 1987 and 2000.  In Peru, the Headcount increased at an annual 
growth rate of 19% over the period 1985 to 2000. The OLS results in column 1 indicate that if Peru 
had had Chile’s level of financial intermediary development, Headcount would have increased only 
at an annual rate of 5% per year, which would have resulted in a share of the population living on 
less than one dollar of about 2% in 2000 rather than the actual value of 15%.
28 Thus, the economic 
impact of financial development on the poverty is quite large. The IV results provide an even 
stronger assessment of the economic impact of well-developed financial intermediaries. 
  While we have stressed the robustness of the results to various permutations throughout the 
presentation, we emphasize two additional sensitivity tests in closing. First, there may exist 
concerns that we have not controlled for the level of real per capita GDP in the poverty alleviation 
regressions.  Instead, we control for the initial level of the poverty indicators in Table 5.  
Nevertheless, when we control for the initial level of real per capita GDP, none of the results 
changes. Second, selecting a poverty line is inherently arbitrary. Thus, we re-did the analyses of 
poverty alleviation using the $2 a day poverty line. We confirm the Table 5 results: Financial 
development reduces the fraction of the population living below $2 a day. 
 
                                                 
28 To get this, recall that the regressors are in logs and note that the ln(0.54) - ln(0.13) = 1.42. Multiplying this with the 
coefficient in column 1 (-0.1), yields 0.14.  Thus, instead of growing at a rate of 0.19, Peru’s Headcount would have 
grown at an annual rate of 0.05. Starting from an initial value of Headcount of 1.1 percent and accumulating over 15 
years, yields the result in the text. 
  28IV. Conclusions 
  An extensive literature shows that financial development is positively associated with the 
growth rate of per capita GDP. This does not necessarily mean, however, that financial development 
reduces poverty. If financial development increases average growth only by increasing the incomes 
of the rich and hence by increasing income inequality, then financial development will not lower 
poverty rates.  
Given the extremely high rates of poverty around the world, this paper focuses on whether 
financial development reduces poverty. Because of measurement problems, we assess the impact of 
financial development on poverty alleviation in two ways. First, we assess the relationship between 
financial development and changes in the distribution of income. Here, we use data on 52 
developing and developed economies with data averaged over the period 1960 to 1999. Second, we 
assess the direct relationship between financial development and poverty alleviation.  Here, we use 
data on 58 developing countries with data over the period 1980 to 2000. 
  This paper finds that greater financial development induces (i) incomes of the poor to grow 
faster than average GDP per capita, (ii) income inequality to fall more rapidly, and (iii) poverty 
rates to decrease at a faster rate.  All of these results hold when controlling for the average rate of 
economic growth, which suggests that financial development alleviates poverty beyond its affect on 
aggregate growth. Furthermore, these results hold when using instrumental variables to control for 
endogeneity bias. Thus, we find that financial development reduces poverty by exerting a 
disproportionately positive effect on the poor. Future research needs to identify which policies 
induce poverty-alleviating improvements in the financial system.   
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  34Table 1: Financial Development and Growth of Inequality and Social Indicators 
 
GDP per capita is in constant 1995 US$ and averaged over the period 1960-1999. Private Credit equals claims of financial institutions on the 
private sector as a share of GDP averaged over the period 1960-1999. Income Growth of the Poor equals the annual growth rate of income per 
capita of the poorest quintile over the period 1960-1999.Growth of Gini is the annual growth rate of the Gini coefficient over the period 1980-
2000. Growth of Headcount is the annual growth rate of the percentage of the population living below the national poverty line, as defined as 
living on $1 a day.  Growth of Poverty Gap is the annual growth rate of the mean shortfall from the poverty line expressed as a percentage of the 
poverty line.  Detailed variable definitions and sources are in the appendix. 
 
  GDP per capita  Private Credit 
Income Growth of 
the Poor  Growth of Gini  
Growth of 
Headcount 
Growth of Poverty 
Gap 
Australia 19,045  0.535 0.020 0.004 
Burundi 181  0.095 0.031 0.083
Burkina Faso  241  0.134 -0.084 -0.161
Bangladesh  291 0.202 0.015 0.002 0.019 0.018
Bulgaria 1,536  0.089 0.296 0.170
Bahamas, The  13,057 0.473 0.018 -0.008 
Bolivia  887 0.288 0.010 -0.005 0.109 0.230
Brazil 4,217  0.273 0.003 0.007  -0.018 -0.018
Botswana 2,751  0.116 -0.010 0.002
Canada 18,947  0.744 0.020 0.004 
Chile 3,621  0.538 0.011 0.005  -0.143 -0.133
Cote d'Ivoire  916  0.310 0.092 0.144
Cameroon 761  0.190 -0.128 -0.159
Colombia  2,122 0.284 0.021 0.000 0.002 -0.015
Costa Rica  3,126  0.160 -0.001 0.001  -0.105 -0.115
Germany 27,272  0.966 0.018 0.000 
Denmark 32,113  0.413 0.027 0.002 
Dominican Republic  1,590  0.258 -0.002 0.009 
Algeria 1,636  0.311 -0.059 -0.140
Ecuador  1,746 0.233 0.003 0.011 0.209 0.263
Egypt, Arab Rep.  958  0.325 0.042 -0.010  -0.028 -0.026
Spain 13,514  0.783 0.032 -0.004 
Ethiopia 107  0.162 -0.019 -0.025
Finland 25,114  0.628 0.057 -0.018 
France 25,210  0.891 0.044 -0.010 
United Kingdom  17,732  0.856 0.014 0.008 
Ghana 352  0.034 -0.003 0.006
Gambia 366  0.159 -0.118 -0.163
Greece 11,057  0.398 0.022 0.003 
Guatemala 1,434  0.160 -0.083 -0.122
Guyana 757  0.336 -0.001 -0.006  -0.183 -0.214
Hong Kong, China  18,691  1.483 0.052 0.005 
Honduras 699  0.297 0.013 -0.003  -0.037 -0.047
Croatia 4,430  0.323 0.045 -0.112
Hungary 4,622  0.286 0.139 0.139
Indonesia 794  0.300 0.044 -0.002  -0.088 -0.127
India 327  0.251 0.022 -0.004 
Jamaica 1,970  0.266 0.015 -0.007 -0.209 -0.261
Japan 37,559  1.475 0.055 -0.007 
Kenya 338  0.306 -0.084 -0.168
Korea, Rep.  8,093  0.861 0.066 0.001 
Lao PDR  345  0.060 0.235 0.354
Sri Lanka  646  0.190 0.034 -0.005  -0.033 -0.048
Lesotho 490  0.151 0.022 0.048
Morocco 1,258  0.307 -0.092 -0.155
Madagascar 265  0.147 -0.017 -0.002 0.010 0.016
  35  GDP per capita  Private Credit 
Income Growth of 
the Poor  Growth of Gini  
Growth of 
Headcount 
Growth of Poverty 
Gap 
Mexico 3,298  0.172 0.012 0.002  -0.022 0.006
Mali 264  0.131 0.296 0.451
Mongolia 430  0.089 0.221 0.324
Mauritania 446  0.315 -0.045 -0.078
Malaysia 3,386  0.894 0.041 0.002 -0.188 -0.230
Niger  242 0.120 -0.013 0.007 0.124 0.334
Nigeria  251 0.139 -0.005 0.003 0.006 0.015
Nicaragua 512  0.276 0.006 0.013
Netherlands 24,810  1.215 0.035 -0.009 
Norway 30,246  0.814 0.052 -0.012 
Pakistan 436  0.237 0.028 0.000  -0.114 -0.160
Panama 2,910  0.559 -0.023 0.010 
Peru  2,278 0.135 0.001 -0.006 0.191 0.238
Philippines 1,095  0.333 0.016 0.004 -0.026 -0.039
Poland 2,953  0.155 0.389 0.570
Portugal 9,582  0.721 0.039 -0.006 
Paraguay 1,832  0.182 0.123 0.231
Romania 1,658  0.079 0.230 0.118
Senegal 562  0.276 -0.005 0.002  -0.177 -0.314
Singapore 18,526  0.974 0.052 0.002 
Sierra Leone  273  0.036 -0.077 0.006 
El  Salvador  1,495 0.058 -0.012 0.001 0.034 0.013
Slovenia 10,091  0.258 -0.139 -0.139
Sweden 27,103  1.078 0.033 -0.009 
Thailand 2,009  0.711 0.031 0.004  -0.127 -0.246
Trinidad and Tobago  4,502  0.436 0.021 0.002  0.141 0.400
Tunisia 1,910  0.587 0.036 -0.002 -0.110 -0.105
Turkey 2,519  0.155 0.029 -0.002  -0.041 -0.041
Uganda 259  0.025 -0.003 -0.014
Uruguay 5,512  0.317 -0.056 -0.048
United States  25,730  0.944 0.011 0.009 
Venezuela  3,533 0.321 0.001 0.003 0.038 0.089
Vietnam 253  0.150 0.039 0.054
South Africa  4,137  0.521 0.010 0.029
Zambia 478  0.062 -0.027 0.004  -0.002 -0.025
  36Table 2: Summary Statistics and Correlations 
 
Panel A presents the descriptive statistics and Panels B and C present the correlations.  
Income Growth of the Poor equals the annual change in the logarithm of the level of income per capita of the poorest quintile over the period 
1960-1999. Growth of Gini is the annual change in the logarithm of the Gini coefficient over the period 1960-99. GDP Per capita growth equals 
the growth rate of real GDP per capita over the periods 1960-99 and 1980–00 respectively. Private Credit equals claims of financial institutions 
on the private sector as a share of GDP averaged over the periods 1960-99 and 1980-00 respectively. Growth of Headcount is the annual growth 
rate of the percentage of the population living below the national poverty line, as defined as living on $1 a day, over the period 1980-2000.  
Growth of Poverty Gap is the annual growth rate of the mean shortfall from the poverty line expressed as a percentage of the poverty line, over 
the period 1980-2000.  Panel B presents correlations for the period 1960-99. Panel C presents correlations for the sample 1980 – 2000. Detailed 
variable definitions and sources are in the appendix.  
 
Panel A: 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Income growth of poor  52  0.018 0.025 -0.077  0.066
Growth of Gini  52  0.000 0.006 -0.018  0.011
GDP per capita growth 60-99  52  0.020 0.017 -0.021  0.067
GDP per capita growth 80-00  58  0.015 0.022 -0.057  0.063
Private Credit: 60-99  52  0.415 0.302 0.048  1.477
Private Credit: 80-00  58  0.245 0.161 0.025  0.894
Growth of Headcount  58  0.008 0.131 -0.209  0.389




Income growth  
of poor  Growth of Gini 
GDP per capita 
growth 60-99 
Growth of Gini  -0.491***     
GDP per capita growth 60-99  0.805***  -0.072   
Private Credit: 60-99  0.620***  -0.206  0.646*** 









GDP per capita 
growth 80-00 
Growth of Poverty Gap  0.934***     
GDP per capita growth 80-00  -0.125  -0.129   
Private Credit: 80-00  -0.411***  -0.349***  0.221 
***, ** and * represent significance at 1, 5 and 10% level respectively. 
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Table 3: Finance and Income Growth of the Poor  
 
The dependent variable is Income Growth of the Poor, which equals the annual growth rate in the income per capita of the poorest 
quintile over the period 1960-1999. The regressors are as follows. Initial Income of the Poor equals the logarithm of the initial level of 
income per capita of the poorest quintile (e.g., 1960 data). GDP per capita growth equals the growth rate of real GDP per capita over 
the period 1960-1999. Trade Openness equals the logarithm of the share of exports plus imports relative to GDP averaged over the 
period 1960-1999. Inflation is the growth rate of the GDP deflator over the period 1960-1999. Schooling 1960 is the logarithm of 
secondary school attainment from the Barro-Lee dataset in 1960. Private Credit equals the logarithm of claims of financial institutions 
on the private sector as a share of GDP averaged over the period 1960-1999. Specifications (1) - (3) are estimated using OLS with 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. Specifications (4)-(7) are estimated using two-stage least squares with heteroskedasticity 
consistent standard errors, where instrumental variables are used for Private Credit. The instrumental variables are three dummy 
variables for the legal origin of the country and the country’s latitude. Specifically, Common, French and German equal one for 
countries with the respective legal origin and zero otherwise. Latitude is the absolute value of the capital city’s latitude. Robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. Specifications (1) - (3) report the regression R-squared. Specifications (4) - (7) report the 
first-stage R-squared and the test of the over-identifying restrictions (OIR test), which tests the null hypothesis that the instruments are 
uncorrelated with the residuals of the second stage regression. Detailed variable definitions and sources are in the appendix.  
 























Initial income of the 
poor -0.009***  -0.005**   
 
-0.011* -0.011  -0.017 
 [0.003]  [0.002]      [0.006] [0.006] [0.010] 
GDP per capita growth     0.777***  0.852***  0.583**  0.429  0.408  -0.007 
    [0.119] [0.113] [0.223] [0.307] [0.375] [0.587] 
Private Credit  0.031***  0.016*** 0.011** 0.021*** 0.032**  0.033**  0.047** 
  [0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.007] [0.013] [0.017] [0.023] 
Trade Openness          -0.004    
         [0.004]    
Inflation          0.003  
          [0.003]  
Schooling 1960             -0.001 
            [0.003] 
Constant 0.099***  0.043***  0.014** 0.030** 0.116**  0.095*  0.154* 
  [0.018] [0.016] [0.006] [0.012] [0.056] [0.053] [0.086] 
Estimation Procedure:  OLS  OLS  OLS  IV IV IV IV 
R-squared  0.588  0.726  0.713      
R-squared (1
st  stage)        0.597 0.743 0.756 0.721 
OIR Test (p-values)       0.364  0.1377  0.1132  0.5111 
Observations 52  52  52 52 52 52 48 
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Table 4: Finance and Changes in Income Distribution 
 
The dependent variable is Growth of Gini, which equals the annual growth rate in the Gini coefficient over the period 1960-1999. The 
regressors are as follows. Initial Gini equals the logarithm of the value of the Gini coefficient in 1960. GDP per capita growth equals 
the growth rate of real GDP per capita over the period 1960-1999. Private Credit equals the logarithm of claims of financial 
institutions on the private sector as a share of GDP averaged over the period 1960-1999. Trade Openness equals the logarithm of the 
share of exports plus imports relative to GDP averaged over the period 1960-1999. Inflation is the growth rate of the GDP deflator 
over the period 1960-1999. Schooling 1960 is the logarithm of secondary school attainment from the Barro-Lee dataset in 1960. 
Specification (1) is estimated using OLS with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. Specifications (2) – (5) are estimated 
using two-stage least squares with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors, where instrumental variables are used for Private 
Credit. The instrumental variables are three dummy variables for legal origin of the country and the country’s latitude.  Specifically, 
Common, French and German equal one for countries with the respective legal origin and zero otherwise. Latitude is the absolute 
value of the capital city’s latitude.  Specification (1) reports the regression R-squared. Specifications (2) – (5) report the first-stage R-
squared and the test of the over-identifying restrictions (OIR test), which tests the null hypothesis that the instruments are uncorrelated 
with the residuals of the second stage regression. Detailed variable definitions and sources are in the appendix. 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 
  Growth of Gini  Growth of Gini Growth of Gini Growth of Gini Growth of Gini 
Initial  Gini  -0.013*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.019*** -0.020*** 
  (0.003) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
GDP per capita growth   0.044  0.314**  0.220**  0.280**  0.295** 
  (0.051) (0.135) (0.100) (0.128) (0.138) 
Private  Credit  -0.004*** -0.015*** -0.013*** -0.015*** -0.015*** 
  (0.001) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Trade Openness      0.003     
     (0.002)     
Inflation      -0.002   
      (0.002)   
Schooling  1960       0.003* 
       (0.002) 
Constant  0.041*** 0.063*** 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.053*** 
  (0.012) (0.021) (0.020) (0.019) (0.017) 
Estimation  Procedure:  OLS  IV IV IV IV 
OIR  Test    0.744 0.347 0.440 0.258 
Observations  52 52 52 52 48 
R-squared  0.212      
R-squared (1
st  stage)    0.607 0.665 0.660 0.670 
 ***, ** and * represent significance at 1, 5 and 10% level respectively 40
Table 5: Finance and Poverty Alleviation 
The dependent variables are Growth of Headcount, which equals the annual growth rate of the share of population living below the poverty line of $1/day over the period 1980-2000 and Growth of Poverty Gap, which is the 
annual growth rate in the e mean shortfall from the poverty line of $1/day expressed as a percentage of the poverty line over the period 1980-2000. 
The regressors are as follows. Initial Value is the logarithm of the initial Headcount or Poverty Gap, respectively.  GDP per capita growth equals the growth rate of real GDP per capita over the period 1980-2000. Private 
Credit equals the logarithm of claims of financial institutions on the private sector as a share of GDP averaged over the period 1980-1999. Trade Openness equals the logarithm of the share of exports plus imports relative to 
GDP averaged over the period 1980-1999. Inflation is the growth rate of the GDP deflator over the period 1980-1999. Schooling 1980 is the logarithm of secondary school attainment from the Barro-Lee dataset in 1980. 
Specifications (1) and (2) are estimated using OLS with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. Specifications (3) - (10) are estimated using two-stage least squares with heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors, 
where instrumental variables are used for Private Credit. The instrumental variables are three dummy variables for the legal origin of the country and the country’s latitude. Specifically, Common, French and Socialist equal 
one for countries with the respective legal origin and zero otherwise. Latitude is the absolute value of the capital city’s latitude. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Specifications (1) and (2) report the 
regression R-squared. Specifications (3) - (10) report the first-stage R-squared and the test of the over-identifying restrictions (OIR test), which tests the null hypothesis that the instruments are uncorrelated with the residuals 
of the second stage regression. Detailed variable definitions and sources are in the appendix.  






















Initial  Value                      -0.035*** -0.053*** -0.041*** -0.055*** -0.040*** -0.056*** -0.041*** -0.055*** -0.036** -0.054**
           
             
         
                     
         
   
                  
                  
               
           
             
           
               
(0.011)  (0.015)  (0.012)  (0.017)  (0.011)  (0.017) (0.014) (0.020) (0.016) (0.026)
GDP per capita growth 
 
-0.934  -1.516*  -0.778  -1.492 -0.779 -1.358 -0.784 -1.496 -1.468 -2.008
(0.625)  (0.891)  (0.678)  (0.903)  (0.778)  (0.992) (0.704) (0.952) (0.998) (1.493)
Private  Credit
 
-0.095*** -0.133*** -0.163*** -0.148** -0.158*** -0.147** -0.161*** -0.146** -0.112** -0.048
(0.020)  (0.028)  (0.034)  (0.062)  (0.032)  (0.055) (0.038) (0.068) (0.044) (0.079)
Trade Openness 
 
        -0.002  -0.019         









Constant -0.059  -0.131**  -0.159***  -0.154  -0.143 -0.078 -0.155** -0.151 -0.092 0.052
(0.040)  (0.051)  (0.058)  (0.098)  (0.153)  (0.223) (0.069) (0.099) (0.098) (0.146)
Estimation Procedure:  OLS  OLS  IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV
OIR Test      0.514  0.503  0.485           
                     
              
           
0.538 0.504 0.500 0.623 0.678
Observations 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 47 47
R-squared 0.387 0.362
R-squared (1
st stage)      0.329  0.377  0.399 0.452 0.358 0.402 0.303 0.353
 ***, ** and * represent significance at 1, 5 and 10% level respectively.  
 Figure 1: Partial Scatter Plot of Income Growth of the Poor against Private Credit 
 
Using regression 2 of Table 3, which regresses Income Growth of the Poor against GDP per capita 
Growth, log of Initial Income of the Poor and Private Credit, this figure represents the two-
dimensional representation of the regression plane in Income Growth of the Poor – Private Credit 
space.  To obtain this figure, we regress Income Growth of the Poor on GDP per capita Growth and 
log of Initial Income of the Poor, collect the residuals, and call them e(Income Growth of the Poor | 
X).  Next, we regress Private Credit against GDP per capita Growth and log of Initial Income of the 
Poor, collect the residuals, and call them e(Private Credit | X ).  Then, we plot e(Income Growth of 
the Poor | X) against e(Private Credit | X ).   
 
  41Figure 2: Partial Scatter Plot of Growth of Gini against Private Credit 
 
Using regression 1 of Table 4, which regresses Growth of Gini against log of initial Gini, GDP per 
capita Growth and Private Credit, this figure represents the two-dimensional representation of the 
regression plane in Growth of Gini – Private Credit space.  To obtain this figure, we regress Growth 
of Gini on log of initial Gini and GDP per capita Growth, collect the residuals, and call them 
(Growth of Gini | X).  Next, we regress Private Credit against log of initial Gini and GDP per capita 
Growth, collect the residuals, and call them e(Private Credit | X ).  Then, we plot e(Growth of Gini | 
X) against e(Private Credit | X).   
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Figure 3: Partial Scatter Plot of Growth of Headcount against Private Credit 
 
Using regression 1 of Table 5, which regresses Growth of Headcount against log of initial 
Headcount, GDP per capita Growth and Private Credit, this figure represents the two-dimensional 
representation of the regression plane in Growth of Headcount – Private Credit space.  To obtain 
this figure, we regress Growth of Headcount on log of initial Headcount and GDP per capita 
Growth, collect the residuals, and call them (Growth of Headcount | X).  Next, we regress Private 
Credit against log of initial Headcount and GDP per capita Growth, collect the residuals, and call 
them e(Private Credit | X ).  Then, we plot e(Growth of Headcount | X) against e(Private Credit | X).   
 
  Appendix: Variable Definitions 
V a r i a b l e       V a r i a b l e   D e f i n i t i o n          S o u r c e  
 
Income Growth of the Poor                           GDP per capita growth of the lowest income quintile group       World Development Indicators (WDI), 
Dollar and Kraay (2002) 
 
Growth of Gini                                               The Gini coefficient is the ratio of the area between the Lorenz Curve, which plots share  Dollar and Kraay (2002) 
  of population against income share received, to the area below the diagonal. It lies  
between 0 and 1, where 0 is perfect equality and 1 is perfect inequality. The growth rate 
 is calculated  as the log difference between the last and the first available observations,  
divided by the number of years. 
 
Growth of Headcount  Headcount is the percentage of the population living below the national poverty line,   Povcal Net, World Bank 
as defined as living on $1 a day. The growth rate is calculated as the log difference 
between the last and the first available observations, divided by the number of years. 
 
Growth of Poverty Gap  The poverty gap is defined as the mean shortfall from the poverty line, expressed as   Dollar and Kraay (2002) 
a percentage of the poverty line. The growth rate is calculated as the log difference 
between the last and the first available observations, divided by the number of years. 
    
GDP per capita                                GDP per capita in constant 1995 US$            WDI 
 
GDP per capita Growth                           GDP per capita growth, annual %         WDI,  Dollar  and  Kraay  (2002) 
 
Private Credit                                    The claims on private sector by deposit money banks and other       IFS, own calculations 
financial institutions as a share of GDP 
 
Schooling in 1960/1980                 The logarithm of the average years of school attainment in 1960 or 1980    Barro-Lee dataset; Barro and Lee (1993)   
 
Inflation                         The growth rate of the GDP deflator            WDI 
  
Trade Openness                                 The logarithm of the share of imports plus exports in GDP        WDI 
 
Latitude                               The absolute value of the latitude of the country, scaled to take values     La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and  
between  0  and  1         Vishny  (henceforth  LLSV,  1999) 
            
Common                                  A dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the origin of the country’s legal  
system is British and zero otherwise.       LLSV  (1999)   
 
French                                  A dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the origin of the country’s legal  
system is French and zero otherwise.       LLSV  (1999) 
 
German                                  A dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the origin of the country’s legal  
system is German and zero otherwise.       LLSV  (1999) 
 
  44Socialist                                  A dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the country is a transition economy  
and  zero  otherwise.         LLSV  (1999)   
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